"The art of dogma in Business Intelligence and Strategic .... "Interview To avoid frustration an intelligence operation without ...
Find this article in L'Usine Nouvelle dated December 2008 that I found by browsing through my notes which I took the title. From Michel Iwochewitsch, associate director of Strateco, a consulting company in strategy, this analysis without concessions attributed the difficulties encountered by economic and strategic intelligence (ISI) in excess of dogmatism in the profession. I found many ideas with pleasure that I stand for "intelligence culture" I think it necessary to change by strengthening its theoretical basis.
Among the doctrines that he denounces include "
most famous as the intelligence cycle! Beautiful "theory" ... But so far from Reality! , with a concomitant "conspicuously absent
cycle, the end customer . "Let's be clear
" he says, "
cycle illustrates the different functions of an organic military intelligence service ... ","
leave the cycle to its original role: a simple descriptive organic! .
Other dogma Iwochewitsch pinned by Michel, who says that " IES is to collect information for the decision maker . It " limit the effect of IES minor tasks such as collecting information ", "collection facilitating the emergence of our profession through like barbouzerie and other crossings yellow line ... . The example of the so encouraged " collection of human origin " contributes "to IES mere rumors multiply manifold interactions with the sole purpose" to garner "information "Job he likens to the" gossip "(he uses the English word for it gossiper that can be translated as" gossip "). To conclude on this dogma, Iwochewitsch quotes in English an American analyst whose sentence could be translated as: "The collection without exploitation, it's like foreplay without orgasm, just a little more frustration! .
Other dogma although he advises to forget "this pseudo omniscience IES " which "leads the practitioners to "invest" in many related fields such as security, lobbying, influence, communication, marketing, strategy, etc.. . "Yes ," he says, " IES can support these processes in many ways, but no, the practitioner is not an expert in these fields! . Lobbying is taken as an example: " IES is essential to bring the value-added information in a device of lobbying, which in itself is a decision process, but in any case, a specialist in IES is able in turn to mount a lobbying operation! He knows nothing of the methods and techniques lobbyist. The same applies to other areas of information. " let us focus on our core business ," he adds, " offer companies and operational methodologies that aim to bring the value-added information and streamlines decision-making through it! .
I found satisfaction with at Michel Iwochewitsch many ideas I raised in my Articles about some "intelligence culture" I think it necessary to change by strengthening its theoretical foundation: the inadequacy of the intelligence cycle as taught in textbooks, confusion between intelligence gathering (mostly related to espionage) and intelligence, the importance of the operation, the confusion between the operational business intelligence that aims to enlighten and intelligence function itself.
Iwochewitsch we book Michel concluded his own conception of intelligence, that we can discuss, but is nonetheless original and interesting to analyze. It does not seem at first a radical departure from the definition that is made in the report Marten, but differs in that it still is restricted to addressing the threats. According to him, " IES approach is fundamentally a risk . The craft, " when integrated into the decision process of the enterprise is indeed a risk management activity (...) by analyzing a situation informational made available to a process decision. " " Neither more nor less ... "he adds," and this is in itself an art - complex - and full! .
strategy with much needed information on threats as opportunities, this restriction in the management of risks does not seem to have applied to intelligence in general, but this presentation is nevertheless important merit to draw attention to the notion of risk that is specific to the scope of the strategy and, consequently, the intelligence that illuminates it. Intelligence aims, providing useful information to decision in action to help reduce the risks inherent in any activity conducted in an uncertain environment.
When handling the theoretical concepts for studying the processes involved in developing intelligence, it is often necessary to make the connection with scientific research and interest in the epistemology . What distinguishes the intelligence of scientific research, which both meet a need of knowledge and involve similar mechanisms intellectuals, it is probably this characteristic that has to apply to activities performed in an uncertain environment, so hostile, where the risk is a major part . This finding that the perception of the IES by confirms Iwochewitsch Michel, is the originality of the information considered subject to scientific research, which appears as the field of academic study beyond the strict confines of epistemology.
The author summarizes by saying that " IES is basically a" tool "like other cutting tools - HR strategy, lobbying, legal, etc.. - Which allows a company to receive a contribution of informational quality from various sources . But, he adds, " unlike other disciplines transverse IES now suffers from the fragility of its foundations: some R & D, a methodological body undefined, no publications scientists, etc.. .
To avoid frustration an intelligence without exploitation, which would be like without these preliminary orgasm, we wish, with Michel Iwochewitsch, the university looks finally to the exploitation of intelligence as the true object of research truly distinct from epistemology, its techniques and its original methods as its difficulty in adapting to technical operational current turmoil.
FB