" intelligence in politics is to say in advance what will happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year .. . And then having the intellect to explain why this did not happen. "(Winston Churchill)
A recent speech by General Vincent Desportes speaking on the topic of strategic thinking French before members of the blog" geostrategic alliance "leads me to clarify my ideas on the process of strategic decision, and the place that the prediction and forecasting (including General Desportes seems wary) I think it should take, without being confused with intelligence.
A recent speech by General Vincent Desportes speaking on the topic of strategic thinking French before members of the blog" geostrategic alliance "leads me to clarify my ideas on the process of strategic decision, and the place that the prediction and forecasting (including General Desportes seems wary) I think it should take, without being confused with intelligence.
General says in effect that "operational Foresight is an extremely dangerous " he " be done without losing sight of that war is a dialectical exercise that involves another "and that" the particular point of war is that if you conceive in advance, this war will not . And he adds: "If you plan war, and if in addition, incredible, you tell others how you want to do it, as did the U.S., then this war is not. The Iraqis were not in their staffs March 17, 2003, they had left because they knew perfectly well that the first night of bombing, would be bombed every PC. .
In my various articles, I often defend the idea that intelligence does not enlighten the future but only the present. The forecast can not take the intelligence that is a provider of information useful to the strategist maker. Expect this is already decided by one or several possible scenarios for the future. In this, the prediction is the essence of the decision. Only to have all the facts of the problem, the strategist is necessarily only one who can decide on a scenario "predictable" and take responsibility for a strategy. It is true that in operational activities, forecasting is a difficult art, if not impossible and that the decision in uncertainty remains the preserve of the military leader. It is certainly a good idea that we have in mind when one is tempted to ask the intelligence, as is often the case, to provide forecasts, which he can not do (the information shines than the present, never the future).
In my various articles, I often defend the idea that intelligence does not enlighten the future but only the present. The forecast can not take the intelligence that is a provider of information useful to the strategist maker. Expect this is already decided by one or several possible scenarios for the future. In this, the prediction is the essence of the decision. Only to have all the facts of the problem, the strategist is necessarily only one who can decide on a scenario "predictable" and take responsibility for a strategy. It is true that in operational activities, forecasting is a difficult art, if not impossible and that the decision in uncertainty remains the preserve of the military leader. It is certainly a good idea that we have in mind when one is tempted to ask the intelligence, as is often the case, to provide forecasts, which he can not do (the information shines than the present, never the future).
But if the forecast or outlook can be expected of intelligence, do they not fall in the middle of the strategy? The idea to prepare for the threats it is important to provide it is not the basis of any strategy aimed at fulfilling the primary function of hosts? Si vis pacem para bellum, it was said in Latin. The idea of preparing for war so it does not take place, has also been brought to its logical extreme with nuclear deterrence.
The example of the U.S. offensive in Iraq March 17, 2003 reflects only one small aspect of the complex phenomenon of war, that of the initial offensive. It does not allow me to support an argument that there would be nothing to "design in advance" (anticipating, planning) strategies on the pretext that the other (the opponent) does not exist yet .
I do not understand is this formula that aims to show that "since no other, there is no strategy. " If the prediction is a difficult art, planning and foresight seem so essential in strategy. The strategist's mission is to prepare its military to deal with any conceivable kind of opponent. This is good for him to investigate all possible fields and prepare to cope. There is not an adversary, but several possible opponents that only foresight is able to emerge even if they are imaginary.
Although we can not know what will be armed in 50 years, the hallmark of a defense policy which is inseparable from a political weapon, is being able to project into the future far enough to be consistent with the time of conception and development of systems weapons increasingly complex. Military thinking is not confined to military action but should address the whole phenomenon war and in particular in its preparation. Clemenceau was undoubtedly correct that the conduct of the war could not be entrusted to the military alone, but there is yet no question that it can not be without them. To this we must add that the war is being prepared, for this purpose it must think, and that either can not be done without them. What would become of strategic thinking if she would just think about the past or present war by refusing to think about the future?
In the process of strategic decision making, forecasting and foresight are clearly distinguished from intelligence, which nevertheless contributes to the power to participate in strategic planning and allow the strategist to anticipate.
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